The Iraq War did not end when the last U.S. troops finally departed over eight years after they first arrived in 2003. Instead, the war continued, albeit absent further direct American participation. In that sense, President Obama’s insistence back in December 2011 that the United States had created “a sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq, with a representative government that was elected by its people” always contained more than a little eyewash.
Still, we were out of Iraq and glad to be done with the place. The question now is whether the President can avoid being drawn back in. Sadly, his actions today invite that prospect.
Evidence that the war continued after we quit Iraq was readily apparent in the accumulating body count resulting from Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis murdering one another in ever growing numbers. Although the press dutifully reported on the mayhem, the story never resonated. Perhaps understandably, most Americans were inclined to tune out developments in a place that most wished to forget. Nonetheless, in May 2014, for example, the death toll from sectarian violence totaled 799 — hardly an indicator of internal peace and harmony.
Events of the last week represent a dramatic escalation in this ongoing sectarian war. In the face of an assault by a ferocious but small band of militants, the performance of the American-trained Iraqi security forces has been shockingly poor. Today, Iraq itself teeters on the edge of a precipice. On the one side there is the prospect of outright disintegration. On the other the possibility of protracted civil war, the country plunging back into the sort of anarchy triggered by George W. Bush’s foolhardy decision to invade in the first place.
In hopes of averting either of these two unhappy prospects, Obama now proposes to send a limited number of U.S. military trainers and advisers back into the war zone. If press reports are to be believed, his administration is also maneuvering behind the scenes to replace Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki with someone more suitable — a figure presumably able to unite the various Iraqi factions and inject some backbone into the failing Iraqi army.
There are two problems with this course of action.
The first is that 300 American advisers, however competent, are unlikely to convert an inept army into a competent one, certainly not overnight. Indeed, the Iraqi army that exists today is the beneficiary of several years of U.S. tutelage, which apparently didn’t quite take.
Moreover, the shortcomings evident the performance of Iraq’s army may well stem not from a lack of skill but from a lack of will. If that’s the case, no amount of instruction on marksmanship or field craft is going to fix the problem. Americans can’t make Iraqis care enough about their country to fight and die for it.
If 300 trainers don’t suffice to turn the tide, then what? Will Obama be willing and able to cut his losses? Or will it be, in for a penny, in for a pound? The President offers assurances that there will be no American “boots on the ground.” Yet like it or not, the slippery slope of further escalation beckons.
The second problem is that removing Maliki begs the question of who will succeed him. Forgive the Vietnam analogy, but back in 1963, the Kennedy administration persuaded itself that arranging for the overthrow of South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem would reenergize a failing war effort. The CIA conspired with South Vietnamese generals to eliminate (and murder) Diem. What ensued, however, was chaos, as the leaders who succeeded Diem proved to be utterly incompetent.
Does the Obama administration have the ability to do any better this time around, identifying the Iraqi equivalent of George Washington? There is little reason to believe so.
Investing in a nearly bankrupt company is a risky venture requiring a strong stomach. What we have in Iraq is an enterprise well into the process of going belly up. Having already expended thousands of lives and perhaps a trillion dollars in an ill-advised and unsuccessful salvage operation, how much more should Americans be willing to spend?
Bacevich is a professor of international relations at Boston University’s Pardee School of Global Studies.
